The main objective of the project is to defend a compatibilist solution to the problem of the relationship between divine omniscience and human freedom.

It is argued that the only justification of the claim that we are never able to do anything such that, if we had done it, then the past would have been different, lies in the asymmetry of openness between fixed past and open future. This asymmetry consists in the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. However, a Leibnizian type of explanation of the source of God’s foreknowledge entails that the asymmetry of openness does not apply to God’s past beliefs about future contingencies. This manifests itself in the truth of backtracking counterfactuals of the form: If S had done otherwise at t, God’s beliefs would have been different prior to t. But if the asymmetry of openness is thus limited, then it is implausible to claim that we are unable to do anything such that, if we were to do it, God’s past beliefs would have been different. 

The proposed defence of compatibilism is strengthened by placing it within the framework of D. Lewis’s account of philosophical disagreements. Finally, it is maintained that the problem posed by divine foreknowledge is philosophically relevant regardless of whether God exists. It helps us to understand better the principle of the fixity of the past and work out the adequate concepts of freedom, free will, and the ability to do otherwise. Its usefulness in this respect can be compared to the utility of considering malicious demons in epistemology or Newcomb’s demon in decision theory.